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Seminar context 
One of the main features of Wales’ distinctive governance arrangements since 1999 has 
been the establishment of Commissioner and Ombudsman offices In March 2014, academics 
at Aberystwyth University arranged an inter-disciplinary seminar with the objective of 
critically examining, within a comparative UK and Ireland context, the role of Commissioner 
and Ombudsman offices within the political and administrative structures of devolved Welsh 
governance (see seminar programme on page 13). 
It was deemed timely to organise a seminar on this topic under ‘Chatham House’ 
rules bringing together senior-level practitioners and academics in this field in the Welsh 
devolved context with counterparts from other parts of the UK and Ireland. Its timing 
coincided with the announcement in February 2014 of a Review into the Children’s 
Commissioner for Wales (which subsequently led to the establishment in June 2014 of an 
independent review into the role and functions of that office).  Proposals were also 
underway for the creation of a Future Generations Commissioner for Wales that 
subsequently formed part of the Well-being and Future Generations (Wales) Bill introduced 
in the National Assembly for Wales in July 2014. At the UK level, the UK Parliament’s Public 
Administration Committee reported in April 2014 on its review of the Parliamentary and 
Health Services Ombudsman and discussions were ongoing on the potential implications of 
the EU Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution to be implemented from July 2015. 
To date, valuable academic work has considered individual Commissioners in Wales 
(e.g. the Children’s Commissioner, the Older People’s Commissioner for Wales, the Welsh 
Language Commissioner). However, that work has not been brought together to reflect 
more broadly upon the position of the Commissioners and the Ombudsman in Wales and 
this is therefore an understudied academic area that has major policy implications for the 
future nature of Welsh governance.  Accordingly, the seminar’s intention was to reflect 
more holistically upon the position of the Commissioner and Ombudsman offices in a 
devolved Wales. In a comparative perspective, the seminar sought to examine various 
factors relating to Commissioners and Ombudsmen, particularly their legal status and 
accountability, their relations with executives and legislatures, their policy-making input and 
the implications of multi-level governance and the multi-level division of competences 
within the devolved UK.  
We are very grateful to the Institute of Welsh Politics, the Department of 
International Politics, the Department of Law and Criminology and the Sir David Hughes 
Parry Fund, all forming part of Aberystwyth University for their financial support for the 
seminar and to the Presiding Officer Dame Rosemary Butler for sponsoring the event. Dyfan 
Powel and Gwenan Creunant provided highly effective organisational support for the 
seminar. Many thanks also to the speakers, chairs and attendees for their contribution to an 
event that attempted to reflect on, and influence, the future shape of devolved Welsh 
governance. 
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Executive Summary and Recommendations arising from the Seminar 
 
The seminar highlighted the extent to which Welsh Commissioners have developed their 
roles in their respective fields. It also underlined the merits of a single Welsh public services 
Ombudsman compared to the multiple ombudsmen in England. A number of examples of 
good practice were identified in the seminar and on this basis Wales can be considered as an 
exemplar. Based on the seminar’s deliberations, the following recommendations can be 
made in order to sustain and enhance Commissioners’ and the Ombudsman’s role in Welsh 
governance: 
 
1. Efforts should be made to produce a firmer and clearer definition of a 
‘Commissioner’. Alternatively, steps could be taken to address the potential 
misconceptions and expectations emanating from the lack of clarity and consistency 
relating to their responsibilities and functions.  
2. To ensure independence, there is overwhelming consensus that Commissioners 
should not be appointed by the government, but probably by the legislature. Any 
reviews of Commissioners and establishment of new offices should consider the 
need for greater consistency in the appointments and funding process leading to a 
model of formal appointment by the legislature.  
3. In response, the National Assembly for Wales needs to review its procedures and 
arrangements for scrutiny of the Commissioners and the Ombudsman to ensure that 
accountability processes are in line with international best practice. The ‘triple lock’ 
solution (see page 9) should be considered as a means of ensuring sufficient scrutiny 
of Commissioners and Ombudsmen. 
4. Any reviews of Commissioner and Ombudsman offices and the establishment of 
new offices need to consider the issue of appointment length and renewal of post. 
This should ensure transparent arrangements to enhance their independence and 
integrity. Serious consideration should be given to making unrenewable fixed term 
appointments uniform. 
5. There is a tension between ensuring accountability and guaranteeing independence. 
In order to maintain independence from the executive but ensure some mechanism 
for dealing with serious problems, it was suggested that there might be 
consideration of a ‘nuclear option’ of a 2/3 majority vote of the legislature to 
remove a Commissioner or Ombudsman from a post.  
6.  ‘Own-initiative’ powers should be considered as a means of enhancing the 
Ombudsman role.  
7. In relation to their powers, the problems and lack of clarity surrounding the 
jurisdiction of Commissioners and the Ombudsman in relation to non-devolved 
services and competences within Wales need to be resolved. One potential option 
would be to include these issues in the context of any Silk Commission Part II 
developments.  
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8. Greater consideration is required regarding the scrutiny of private sector 
organisations as they are increasingly coming into the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman and Commissioners as public services providers.  
9. Measures could be considered to generate greater clarity and accountability 
regarding the roles of Commissioners during the policy process (see page 11). In 
addition, attention could be given to ways of strengthening the legislature’s 
understanding of the Commissioners and the Ombudsman’s capabilities and 
capacities. One potential consequence could be to encourage greater use of the 
offices.  
 
Part 1 – Key issues: The Commissioner and Ombudsman offices in Wales to date: an 
overview 
 
The strengths of current Commissioners and Ombudsman models in Wales 
Whilst Commissioners have a more distinctive advocate role, the Ombudsman role in the UK 
is driven by individual complaints regarding maladministration or failure of a service. 
Following investigation, they may develop a role in advocating for the complainant. The 
investigation following an individual complaint can potentially contribute towards improving 
public services.   
Overall, through their functions of inquiry, scrutiny and calling others to account, the 
Ombudsman and the Commissioners in Wales were deemed to be vitally important to 
ensuring social justice and to service delivery improvements. Attention was drawn to the 
innovative aspects associated with Commissioners and they present potential models for 
developments in other jurisdictions. An illustrative example was interest from Australia in 
Wales’ Older People’s Commissioner. Equally, the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales 
holds an exemplar position both in the UK and beyond. 
 
Commissioners 
Amongst the strengths associated with the Welsh Commissioners were the following: 
 a proactive approach to promoting rights and welfare rather than solely reacting to 
unsatisfactory conduct;  
 a potentially valuable and influential role in the legislative process in the context of 
law reform. It must however be noted that the Welsh Language Commissioner has a 
different position to the other Welsh Commissioners in enforcement and regulation 
due to the power to issue compliance notices;  
 their use of broader European, international and human rights benchmarks e.g. 
European Convention on Human Rights and international instruments such as the 
United Nations Principles for Older People and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child; 
 Welsh Commissioners’ involvement with other Commissioners across the UK and 
Ireland with the potential for greater involvement with their respective positions in 
the EU and globally. 
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Ombudsman 
The Public Services Ombudsman for Wales Act 2005 established a single public services 
ombudsman bringing together the previous functions of different Ombudsmen. As it was 
based on the post-devolution Scottish legislation it attempted to reflect the cutting edge 
Ombudsman legislation of its time. Its success can be evaluated according to the criteria set 
up by the Ombudsman Association validation scheme applicable to every ombudsman in the 
UK. The criteria include the following principles: 
 Independence 
 Fairness 
 Openness and transparency 
 Accountability 
 Compliance to good governance 
 Good complaints handling 
 
The strengths of the Welsh scheme are clear in the way in which the Ombudsman’s re-
validation was one of the few schemes that passed through without comment as it fully 
complied with the requirements. Other specific examples of the strengths of the Welsh 
arrangements were noted: 
 The reporting arrangements on investigations are less restrictive than other cases 
thus strengthening the potential learning from investigations;  
 In addition to the reporting role, the Office has the capacity to be involved in settling 
or resolving complaints;  
 It has broad discretion as to whether to investigate or not; 
 It has the power in legislation to operate with others, including commissioners.  
 
Collaboration and networks 
A final strength across Commissioners and the Ombudsman is the collaboration and 
networks between them. They have enabled sharing developments and information, and 
avoiding reinventing the wheel. In Wales, the advocacy role of Commissioners and the 
investigation role of the Ombudsman have worked well together. The establishment of 
Memoranda of Understanding have formalised relations and provide a way of balancing 
workloads and roles.  
Collaboration between Commissioners and the Ombudsman have led to 
arrangements that facilitate clarity and simplification for the complainant in the Welsh case 
and are examples of good practice:  
 A Common portal in Wales that deals with public utilities and directs people to other 
ombudsmen etc.; 
 The backroom arrangements, working relationships and practices between the 
Ombudsman and Commissioners work well.  
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Reflections and Challenges 
1. Accountability, independence and appointment 
The general principle voiced was that if a body or an individual is established to advocate on 
behalf of particular groups of people, they should be independent of the Welsh 
Government.  The Public Services Ombudsman for Wales is appointed by and receives 
funding from the Assembly, not the Welsh Government, thus making the lines of 
accountability very clear. The rigorous appointment process includes formal appointment by 
the whole Assembly.  The Ombudsman’s funding autonomy from government was deemed 
to be unusual and viewed as a significant way of avoiding circumstances where a 
government could limit the capacity of an Ombudsman. Accountability to the Assembly has 
been improved by moving from scrutiny in plenary to scrutiny by a committee.  
In contrast, Commissioners are accountable to and scrutinise the Welsh 
Government. In practice, Commissioner appointments have involved an open recruitment 
process, with the decision made by the First Minister based on the recommendations of an 
appointments panel (of Assembly Members), and in some cases involving stakeholders. 
Whilst the Government had posited that this treated candidates in a fair and consistent way, 
the current appointments and funding arrangements were questioned in view of the Paris 
Principles requirements for ‘national human rights institutions’ and their particular stress on 
independence from government. The Assembly has received representations regarding the 
accountability and transparency of Commissioners. Consequently, it was suggested that the 
growing opinion is that Commissioners should be appointed by and be accountable to the 
National Assembly for Wales.   
  
2. Appointment length and renewal of post 
The length and renewal of post and arrangements for removal from office were also 
considered to be critical issues. There are variations in the length of appointment between a 
fixed term of 7 years or alternative arrangements where Commissioners can be reappointed 
after a four years term to a subsequent term. The suggestion was that a longer single term 
might work better. If renewable terms are utilised, an established process for determining 
whether an individual should have a second term is required. That renewal arrangements 
are lacking in transparency is an issue in the UK, Ireland and internationally, thus leading to 
the argument for clear criteria. 
 
3. Powers and structures  
Issues were raised regarding the division of responsibilities between Commissioner and 
Ombudsman offices in Wales and at the UK level. 
 For the Ombudsman, non-devolved services in Wales are currently under the 
jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Ombudsman (UK). A case could be made to transfer 
all issues in Wales to the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales. This would result in 
a more comprehensive response to people in Wales who do not necessarily 
distinguish between public services.  
 There were also examples that highlighted the need to consider circumstances 
where Commissioners are unable to intervene which manifest themselves in Wales 
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because they related to non-devolved issues. In the Children’s Commissioner’s case, 
they are able to speak out on any issue affecting children, but are unable to use 
their powers on non-devolved matters. This has created difficulties e.g. the plight of 
asylum seeker children within the initial accommodation centre in Cardiff. A review 
of the Children’s Commissioner of England concluded that all matters relating to 
children should be within the remit of their respective Commissioners. 
 
Other more specific constraints on powers were raised largely specific to the circumstances 
of individual Commissioners and the Ombudsman and in relation to particular policy areas. 
Of general relevance are:   
 The need for the Ombudsman and the Commissioners’ jurisdiction to keep pace 
with changes in public service. This includes whether binding remedies should be 
afforded to the Ombudsman to reflect the way in which private sector organisations 
are increasingly coming into their jurisdiction given that there is no parallel to the 
role of democratic processes which hold public bodies to account. 
 The requirement in law for complaints to be in writing impedes some citizens from 
making complaints.  
 The findings of the Local Government Ombudsman in England are binding in law. 
 
4. Collaboration and cooperation  
Building on the networks between some of the Commissioners and Ombudsman, these 
arrangements could be extended, for instance in the context of the creation of a Future 
Generations Commissioner for Wales. In addition, there is scope to consider the 
establishment of additional Commissioners, particularly in the context of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of People with Disability. 
 
Part 2 - Key issues: Reflections and comparative insights on the legal status, powers and 
governance arrangements for Commissioners and Ombudsmen 
 
International background 
The Ombudsman was considered as one of the most significant constitutional innovations of 
the second half of the twentieth century, assuming a prominent constitutional position in 
states worldwide. Furthermore, the World Bank now demands that an Ombudsman is in 
place before they enter the process of lending money. This again suggests that the office is 
becoming a cornerstone of state governance. Although the same cannot be claimed with 
regard to Commissioners, a growth in Commissioner creation occurred at the end of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Legal status of Ombudsmen 
Independence is globally recognised as a value of Ombudsmen, alongside their perceived 
role in assisting the citizen in dealings with the state. Independence and autonomy from the 
executive need therefore to be preserved. It should not perceived as being compromised by 
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overly close association with the very institutions and deliverers of services being 
scrutinised.  
Ombudsmen are constitutionally recognised around the world. Although the option 
of protection within a superior constitution is not available to the UK, other tools are 
available for the preservation of independence and autonomy. The New Zealand model, for 
example, has a separate parliamentary committee that oversees the appointment and 
budget of ombudsmen and commissioners.  
 
Powers 
Traditionally, Ombudsmen powers are considered in two distinct categories: 
 Those for fact-finding and dissemination of information. They are used best when 
Ombudsmen are proactive. Consequently, the power of own initiative is an effective 
and desirable addition to their toolkit of powers. Attention was drawn to the Irish 
case where the Ombudsman had own initiative powers since its inception. These 
have been used sparingly and own initiative investigations have proved very 
effective in revealing systemic failures. 
 The ability to make use of findings to persuade, influence and make the case for 
public service providers to make changes. The ability to call service providers to 
account is a particularly effective tool for the Ombudsman.  
 
In terms of Commissioners, attention was drawn to the importance of their powers to carry 
out thematic investigations. For instance, the Northern Ireland Older People’s Commissioner 
can look at any issue she feels is related to older people thus providing a major level of 
discretion, underlining the limits on those Ombudsmen who do not possess own initiative 
powers.  
 
Constraints and Challenges 
Some of the constraints and challenges in comparative cases highlight some of the strengths 
of the Welsh arrangements or reiterate some of the limitations identified in the Welsh case.  
 Attention was drawn to the implications of a lack of own initiative powers. It can 
place an Ombudsman in a difficult position of having to wait for a complaint before 
investigating it, often unable to address those areas where there are no complaints 
but where there may be concern. There is a strong case for ‘own initiative powers’, 
particularly in the field of mental health; 
 It is increasingly the case that complainants do not have the financial resources to 
pursue matters through the courts. There are long waits in the courts system. One 
alternative would be to divert appropriate cases for an ombudsman’s attention. 
There needs to be consideration of how best the courts and ombudsmen might 
interact and in relation to a more effective referral system;  
 Complainants and individuals often don’t have the resources to partake in judicial 
reviews. Supporting the complaints processes in the face of judicial review 
consequently becomes a particularly expensive process; this is a real resource issue.  
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 Other examples of constraints discussed were not being allowed to publish reports 
and issues regarding how work is disseminated, and substantial limits regarding 
reviewing legislation; 
Additional issues include: 
 the need for the work of Ombudsmen and Commissioners to be supported and 
promoted through strong links with the media and public service providers where 
possible and most obviously, with the legislature; 
 The private sector is now a major provider of services without being accountable to 
the legislature. In such cases, different rules should apply i.e. Ombudsmen should 
have powers of legal enforcement.  
 
Scrutiny of Commissioners and Ombudsmen 
If Ombudsmen and Commissioners are to be independent from the executive, the 
relationship between the legislature and Ombudsmen and Commissioners must allow for 
effective scrutiny of their offices. There needs to be consideration of the level of scrutiny 
that is appropriate. Different methods of scrutinising their offices include judicial reviews of 
decisions, annual reports and appearing before the legislature. Fellow watchdogs, auditors 
and information commissioners offer a further means of scrutiny. If these are not robust 
enough in practice, a further ‘triple-lock solution’ could be considered:  
1. Regular reviews asking elementary questions such as ‘do we still need this service’? 
This could act as a necessary test to ensure the offices are still providing a relevant 
service.  
2. The legislature could take the lead and coordinate a more systematic review of the 
sector rather than wait for failure to occur. Again, the New Zealand model with a 
particular committee overseeing the whole sector could be seen as good practice.  
3. Finally, Commissioner and Ombudsman offices could take a lead on their internal 
governance arrangements to ensure they are robust before the more formal 
mechanisms are implemented. For instance, the Local Government Ombudsman in 
England responded to failings by adopting transparency as a guiding principle and by 
appointing an advisory board and a consumer forum, and is now considering 
external review schemes.  
 
Coordination  
The value of robust coordination mechanisms was also raised. The suggestion was that there 
may exist in Northern Ireland a problem of over-accountability due to the overlapping of 
organizations dealing with individuals.  
 
Part 3 – Key issues: Experiences on the ground: Looking in greater detail and Concluding 
Comments 
 
1. Definitions 
The Ombudsman office conforms to a relatively standardised definition and an official 
validation process by the Ombudsman Association is in place to ensure that Ombudsmen 
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conform to the definition. In contrast, there is no universal definition of a Commissioner and 
while all broadly assume a similar role, there can be considerable and substantive differences 
between the various forms. There is however a need to strive for clarity in Commissioners’ 
roles to ensure consistency in expectations and to avoid misconceptions of their functions 
and responsibilities. Overall, whilst there might be subtle distinctions between the 
definitions of the offices they require a level playing field that would include a high degree of 
independence and probity.  
 
2. Appointment and independence  
The independence of the office of Commissioner or Ombudsman is paramount to its 
perceived legitimacy and therefore a constant and key concern. The need to retain 
neutrality is central to the work of the Ombudsman in particular.  
The appointment process lacks consistency. Whilst recognising the Welsh 
Government’s considerable efforts to develop conventions to counter the potential 
problems of executive appointment, there is an overwhelming consensus that 
Commissioners should not be appointed by the executive but rather by the legislature. The 
importance of removing the threats to the perceived independence and politicisation of the 
office was considered to be acutely important in countries of single-party dominance such as 
Wales and in politicised policy fields such as the language. However, it must be borne in 
mind that accountability to specific committees can also threaten to politicise the agenda 
surrounding a Commissioner or Ombudsman.  
Single fixed terms are seen as an effective tool to secure a measure of independence 
with re-election politicking taken out of the equation. Further measures to support the 
independence of the offices from the executive, while remaining some scope to deal with 
problems, include a ‘nuclear option’ for a 2/3 majority vote of the legislature to remove a 
Commissioner or Ombudsman from a post.  
 
3. Powers 
The ‘own initiative’ power to investigate has proved of value to those Commissioners and 
Ombudsmen who wield it. More broadly, it is perceived as a means of increasing their 
contribution, and to improving public services. The use of such powers, however, is a matter 
of discretion for the individual Commissioner or Ombudsman. In theory, this highlights the 
need for independence and the influence of the personal political persuasion of the office or 
individual. 
The extent of powers available to some offices extends to recourse to the High 
Court. Although coercive powers were rarely employed, their existence and the threat they 
hold have impact and are of value to the offices. The perception was that they facilitated the 
process of ensuring that much of the Commissioners’ work with external organisations is 
done on the basis of cooperation. 
There is scope and desire to ‘tidy-up’ the powers of some Commissioners. For others, 
such as the Language Commissioner, it was probably too early to fully evaluate the powers 
bestowed upon the office.  However, in the case of the Welsh Language Commissioner, 
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there did appear a need for enforcement powers to support the Welsh Language Standards 
(relating to the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011).  
The way in which Commissioners’ work can cross into non-devolved areas can lead 
to nervousness and a lack of clarity regarding the use of powers. The conditions of older or 
younger asylum seekers would be one such example. Generally, if a non-devolved matter is 
subsidiary to a devolved matter then the Commissioner ought to be able to act.  
 
4. Relations with institutions  
Despite the potential threat of ‘capture’ and being too close to the Government, good 
practice currently exists in Wales. Plenary time is set for the discussion of Commissioner 
reports and there is a strong tradition of accepting recommendations. However, there is the 
equally important question of implementation and of the Commissioner’s or Ombudsman’s 
ability to follow-up the recommendations made. One suggestion was that Commissioners 
should lay reports before the legislature rather than the executive as their role is to 
scrutinise the executive. If this were pursued, further questions that would arise would 
include whether a report should be considered by a specific or dedicated committee. 
There is some frustration at the relationship with the legislature. Efforts to raise the 
profile of the work have not been fruitful, nor have attempts at familiarising AMs with the 
work of Commissioners and the Ombudsman. A better understanding of the capabilities and 
capacities of the Ombudsman and the Commissioners may encourage greater and more 
effective use of the offices. Whilst attention must be given to their independence and ability 
to set their own priorities, they could potentially be requested to consider investigating 
specific fields that tends to be undertaken through public inquiries. With regard to raising 
the profile of their work, a plenary day for the Ombudsman as in Austria for example is one 
possibility.  
 
5. Role in public policy making 
The impact of Commissioners on policy development can be particularly difficult to assess. 
The main reason is that their interventions can take different forms at different stages of the 
process. For instance, intervention ‘behind the scenes’ and taking advantage of privileged 
access can be particularly effective, but difficult to assess or explain to the public. Early 
intervention can again prove effective but risks ‘capture’ and being seen as ‘too close’ to the 
policymakers. This in turn can jeopardise the perception of independence. Later intervention 
minimises the risks of ‘capture’ but lessens the Commissioner’s influence over the policy. 
Clarity and accountability over the precise roles of the Commissioner during the policy 
process could alleviate some of these concerns. In attempting to influence the public policy 
process, it is important to ground intervention in evidence. There are several effective 
means of doing so; complaints received; thematic investigations; statutory investigations; 
advisory committees.  
The Ombudsman office can also have a role in developing policy but again, 
intervention must be selective and based on strong evidence. The development and use of 
‘own initiative powers’ would be valuable to the Ombudsman, allowing a far more proactive 
and valuable contribution to the policy process. 
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6. Relations between the Commissioners and the Ombudsman  
Relations between the Commissioners seem good with only exceptional instances of 
conflicting views being expressed. Individual Commissioners also work within relevant 
European and international networks. There are good informal networks between the 
Commissioners and the Ombudsman in Wales.  Beyond bilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding, it wasn’t considered appropriate to formalise those networks at this point. 
Nevertheless, as of yet the Welsh Commissioners have not undertaken work 
alongside each other though there may be scope to do so. Furthermore, there is some 
concern over potential overlaps in the responsibilities of offices. They are keen to avoid 
potentially adjudicating or acting in another’s field.  While collaboration is welcome, there is 
a strong notion that the sharing of back-office functions as occurs in Northern Ireland would 
not be suitable. 
 
7. Relations with stakeholders and policy communities  
To protect people’s needs, the relationship between Commissioners and the policy 
communities is as important as the relationship with Government. A Commissioner being 
perceived as ‘too close’ to government can potentially be the cause of division and 
fragmentation within the policy community. Civil society and the broader policy community 
have a particularly important role in empowering the Commissioner. They provide evidence 
through consultation and are a source of the Commissioner’s influence within the policy 
process. Similarly, the Commissioner can stimulate activity within civil society through its 
work.  
However, the relationship between the Commissioner and the broader policy 
community has not yet been defined. There is concern that some actors may feel side-lined 
and ignored following the establishment and empowerment of a single office concerned 
with a specific field.  
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Programme: Commissioners and Ombudsmen and the infrastructure of Welsh 
Governance: lessons from Wales and lessons for Wales 
Convenors: Dr Elin Royles, Ann Sherlock and Prof John Williams, Aberystwyth University 
Date: Thursday 20 March 2014  
Sponsorship: Rosemary Butler AM, Presiding Officer National Assembly for Wales 
 
9.30 - 10.00 Registration and tea and coffee, Pierhead building   
 
Morning Chair - Elizabeth France, Vice President of Aberystwyth University and Chair of the 
Legal Ombudsman 
  
10.00 Introduction Elizabeth France 
Welcome speech Rosemary Butler AM, National Assembly Presiding Officer  
    
10.15 - 11.15 Session 1 
  Commissioners and Ombudsmen in Wales to date: an overview  
 Professor John Williams and Ann Sherlock, Aberystwyth University 
 Peter Tyndall, Ombudsman and Information Commissioner, Ireland 
 Eleri Thomas, Deputy Children’s Commissioner for Wales 
 
11.15- 12.15 Session 2 
Reflections and comparative insights on the legal status, powers and          
governance arrangements for Commissioners and Ombudsmen  
 Dr Richard Kirkham, University of Sheffield 
 Dr Tom Frawley, Northern Ireland Ombudsman 
Evelyn Hoy, Chief Executive Commissioner for Older People Northern Ireland 
  
12.15-1.15 Lunch  
 
Afternoon Chair - David Melding AM, Deputy Presiding Officer, National Assembly for Wales  
 
1.15-2.15 Session 3 - Experiences on the ground: Looking in greater detail  
Breakout sessions   
Groups: Children: Facilitator: Ann Sherlock, Aberystwyth University 
Language - Facilitator: Prof. Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost, Cardiff University 
Older People - Facilitator: Prof. John Williams, Aberystwyth University 
Other Ombudsmen and Commissioners: Dr. Richard Kirkham, Sheffield  University 
 
2.15 - 3.30  Session 4 - Sharing of Findings and Conclusions: Lessons for Wales and  
  Lessons from Wales? Chaired by David Melding AM 
Concluding Comments - Tony King, British Irish Ombudsman Association, 
 Association Chair and The Pensions Ombudsman 
  
